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Abstract This study explores the role of taxes in explaining companies’ financing
decisions. We test whether the corporate tax shields explanation of capital structure
is applicable to firms listed on the Spanish stock exchange over the period 2007–
2013. Taxes are found to be economically and statistically significant determinants of
capital structure. Our results suggest that marginal tax rates affect the debt policies
of Spanish listed companies, and the existence of non-debt tax shields constitutes an
alternative to the use of debt as a tax shelter. Consistent with theoretical expectations,
there is a stronger relation between debt and taxation in less levered firms. Finally,
we empirically estimate the impact of the new thin-capitalization rule put forth by the
Spanish government in 2012 on the financing behaviour of Spanish listed companies.
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Our empirical evidence supports the existence of a tax reform effect, where companies
affected by interest deductibility limitations reduce their leveragemore than companies
that are not affected.
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1 Introduction
A large body of research has examined the effects of corporate taxation. Although the
results of empirical models vary significantly, the majority of this research does find
that, to some degree, taxes influence a broad range of corporate financial decisions
such as financing policy, investment policy or corporate reorganization and hedging.1
The magnitude of these effects and their overall impact on the economy are still
under debate. Notwithstanding, the most significant obstacle a policy maker confronts
in deciding on the tax treatment of corporate debt and equity financing is that the
impact of taxation on corporate financial policy is not entirely understood. In addition,
Graham (2013) reviews a number of studies that suggest that taxes influence financing
decisions; however, this effect is not always strong. Likewise, he concludes that more
research is needed for a better understanding of the influence of taxes on capital
structure, particularly related to time-series effects. Therefore, whether and to what
extent taxation affects the choice of capital structure is still an unsettled topic, deserving
further study.
The meta-study of the existing empirical studies conducted by Feld et al. (2013)
concludes that capital structure choices are indeedpositively affected by taxes, an effect
which is also quantitatively relevant. Tax rates are shown to be correlated with corpo-
rate capital structure choices, which suggests that firms may increase value through
optimal debt choice. The trade-off theory of capital structure offers a theoretical expla-
nation to the relationship between corporate debt policy and taxes. Specifically, this
theory argues that firms determine their optimal debt ratio by comparing the present
value of additional tax savings and of the additional expected cost of financial distress
caused by a marginal increase in debt. There has been relatively limited empirical
research into the effects of marginal corporate tax on debt policy, despite its clear
significance. In this regard, Graham (1996a), as well as the subsequent studies, found
that marginal corporate tax rate does influence the debt policies of US firms.2 In coun-
tries other than the US, Alworth and Arachi (2001) conducted a similar analysis using
a data panel on Italian firms and found a positive relationship between firm-specific
marginal tax rates and Italian firms’ debt policy. In addition, Kunieda et al. (2011),
Hartmann-Wendels et al. (2012) and Sinha and Bansal (2013) obtained analogous
1 A detailed review of the literature on the role of taxes in corporate finance is provided by Graham (2008,
2013).
2 A comprehensive survey of related literature can be found in Graham (2003, 2008, 2013).
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results for Japanese, German and Indian firms, respectively. To the best of our knowl-
edge, there have been no empirical studies to date on the effects of simulated marginal
tax rates on debt policy in Spain.
In the area of public finance, recent debate about corporate tax reform has focused
on the consequences of asymmetric tax treatment of equity and debt financing. US
and European fiscal authorities have considered limiting the ability of companies to
deduct interest payments from taxable income, as well as calling for equal treatment
of equity and debt. Some examples are the Comprehensive Business Income Tax
(CBIT) proposal by the US Treasury, the Mirrlees Review proposals for the UK tax
system or the Resolution of the ECOFIN Council Meeting of June 8, 2010, which
recommended to European Union member States the adoption of thin-capitalization
rules.3 The reason for this is that the tax-favoured status of debt has reduced tax
revenue collection and supposedly encouraged a “debt bias” whereby tax incentives
encourage companies to use extra debt. In this regard, it is believed that excessive
use of debt financing increases firms’ probability of becoming financially distressed
and thereby exacerbates or perhaps even causes economic downturns. According to
Mooij (2011), although the existence of debt in the capital structure did not cause the
financial crisis, excessive leverage makes firms more vulnerable to economic shocks
and therefore debt bias might have contributed to the extent of the crisis.
The main objective of this study is to analyse the relationship between taxes and
debt financing using panel data on Spanish listed companies. More specifically, we
focus on how the deductibility of debt interest affects the capital structure of firms. Our
empirical analysis is based on a sample of Spanish listed firms for the period 2007–
2013. We test the hypothesis that companies have a tax incentive to use debt financing
rather than equity financing because interest paid is tax-deductible while dividends
paid to shareholders are not. Besides, we use the Shevlin (1990) and Graham (1996a)
expectedmarginal tax rate approach to examine the effects of tax on the debt policies of
Spanish firms. In addition, we test the non-debt tax shields hypothesis which considers
other tax shelters different from the interest allowances. In the time period analysed,
the Corporate Tax Income Law was reformed and this fact might have influenced the
debt policy of Spanish listed companies. For that reason, we test for a tax reform effect
and consider this shock as a quasi natural experiment for our research.
This paper contributes to the existing literature on the impact of corporate taxation
on firms’ capital structure, further developing the contributions of previous literature
in different ways. Firstly, we provide additional empirical evidence on the relation-
ship between taxes and debt financing. In contrast with other papers, our measure of
leverage includes only financial debt and directly excludes other liabilities such as
trade payables, which mainly depend on business transactions and not on the effect
of corporate taxation. Secondly, our findings shed some light on this issue in the
European Union, which has received little attention to date in the literature. More-
over, International Financial Reporting Standards were adopted in Spain on January
3 Thin-capitalization refers to when a company is financed with a high level of debt relative to equity.
In turn, thin-capitalization rules imply that a company that has too much debt compared to equity will be
denied fiscal deductions for part of its interest payments, or that part of interest payments will be reclassified
as dividends and will not obviously be considered as fiscal deductions.
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1st 2007, which allows meaningful comparison between our results and those from
other economies that have also implemented these international standards. Thirdly, we
take into account the Spanish corporate tax reform in 2012, as an exogenous shock,
which enacted a new thin-capitalization rule limiting the tax deductibility of financing
expenses. Besides, and as similar tax reforms have been conducted in many OECD
countries, we believe that our conclusionsmight be portable to other settings.Applying
a difference in differences approach, we analyse the potential impact of the abovemen-
tioned reform. Finally, we study a special period partially characterized by a severe
economic and financial crisis that has dramatically affected European Mediterranean
countries such as Spain.
Our findings show that marginal tax rates significantly affect the debt policy of
Spanish listed firms. The results are consistent with the significance of corporate taxes
in company financing decisions considering the uniqueness of the Spanish tax pro-
visions. As expected, there is a stronger relationship between taxes and debt policy
in less levered companies. Furthermore, the existence of non-debt tax shields con-
stitutes an alternative to the use of debt as a tax shelter. Regarding the corporate tax
income reform approved by the Spanish Government in 2012, we found that the new
thin-capitalization rule potentially affected 28 % of the companies in our sample.
On average, these companies had higher debt ratios than their non-affected counter-
parts, and after the reform, the former group on average displayed stronger declining
debt ratios as compared to the latter one. Our analysis provides empirical evidence
consistent with a tax reform effect.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section analyses the
theoretical framework of the study and presents the hypotheses to be tested. Subse-
quently, the Spanish corporate tax legislation is described in Sect. 3, including the new
thin-capitalization rule. In Sect. 4, we discuss the variables definitions, and explain the
estimation of companies’ marginal corporate tax rates. Thereafter, Sect. 5 provides a
description of our sample and analyses descriptively the tax data. The empirical model
specification, econometric methodology and the results are discussed in Sect. 6. Sev-
eral robustness checks are presented in Sect. 7, and the final section draws some
concluding remarks.
2 Theoretical foundation and hypotheses development
Modigliani andMiller (1963)were the first to introduce the idea that corporate taxation
affects the capital structure of firms. In particular, they showed that when corporate
income is taxed and debt interest is a deductible expense, firm value can be increased
by using debt financing rather than funding entirely with equity. In this context, the
increase in a firm’s value is due to the debt tax shield. The question of why debt
financing has traditionally received favourable tax treatment whereas equity financing
has not, seems likely to be the result of historical forces at the time the tax rules
were being developed, rather than any weighty economic reasoning pertaining to
contemporary economic or business circumstances (Strebulaev and Whited 2012).
Earlier empirical articles did not find convincing evidence that taxation affected
firms’ financial policy (see for example,Bradley et al. 1984; Titman andWessels 1988).
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These discouraging results led Myers (1984) to state in his renowned Presidential
Address to the American Finance Association that “we don’t know how firms choose
their capital structures as there is no study clearly demonstrating that a firm’s tax
status has predictable, material effects on its debt policy”. The meta-analysis by Feld
et al. (2013) suggests that very small or even negative tax estimates found in the
studies do not accurately reflect debt response to taxes. It seems difficult to conduct
an effective analysis of a direct relationship between tax rates and debt policy, as most
large corporations have the same statutory tax rate.4 In most developed countries, the
statutory tax laws do not demonstrate any substantial variation in corporate statutory
tax rates over the years and across firms. In the absence of variation in tax rates
through time and across companies, we can only presume a similar debt policy for
each company, which is not the case, or we may end up with contradictory results.
Due to asymmetric tax treatment of corporate profits and losses, the (expected)
marginal tax rate may not be equal to the statutory tax rate. Specifically, although the
statutory tax rate is applied when the taxable income of a company is positive, no
corporate tax is imposed when the taxable income is negative. Even in cases where
a company actually pays zero tax in a year due to incurred losses, its marginal tax
rate may be non-zero. In such a case the marginal tax rate is equal to the discounted
value of the taxes paid on the marginal unit of income in the first year where the firm
is expected to have positive taxable income. Likewise, losses can typically be carried
forward and carried backward in the corporate tax system,which leads to differences in
the marginal tax rates. This dynamic dimension of taxes makes it necessary to forecast
future taxable income in order to estimate current-period tax rates and tax incentives.
Recognizing the existence of loss carried forward and carried backward in the US
corporate tax system, Mackie–Mason (1990) analysed the effects of the marginal tax
rate on debt policy. He found that when a company has loss carried forward and
investment tax credit (i.e., another tax shield), it is less likely to raise capital by new
debt issue. Since both existing loss carried forward and investment tax credit are
substitutes for new debt issue in terms of tax savings, this result is consistent with the
trade-off theory.
Shevlin (1990) implemented the Monte Carlo method using a simple linear projec-
tion of taxable income based on actual past data to simulate future taxable income.
Then, using simulated taxable income series and applyingUScorporate tax law, he esti-
mated the (expected) marginal tax rates of individual firms. Also using this approach,
Graham (1996a) analysed the effects of marginal tax rate on US firms’ debt policy.
He found a positive relationship between the firm-specific marginal tax rate and the
change in debt ratio.
Conversely, there are other empirical studies using statutory tax rates or aver-
age/effective tax rates as proxies for marginal tax rates (see inter alia Bradley et al.
1984; Trezevant 1992; Shum 1996; Sogorb-Mira 2005; De Jong et al. 2008). These
substitutes for tax rates, however, are problematic in that they introduce a significant
4 Statutory tax rates are those percentage rates established by the tax law. Conversely, marginal tax rates
relate to the tax rate attributable to the specific company’s activity and to explicit decisions that may involve
taxes paid (or saved) and income received (or expenses paid) over several years; they can be defined as the
present value of current and expected future taxes paid on an additional unit of income earned today.
123
364 SERIEs (2016) 7:359–391
downward bias in estimates if potential endogeneity bias is not dealt with. Accord-
ingly, Feld et al. (2013) state that the simulatedmarginal tax rates suggested byGraham
(1996a) offer the advantage of avoiding a significant downward bias in estimation. Fur-
thermore, Graham (1996b) and Plesko (2003) show that the simulation approach is
the best available proxy of the “true” marginal tax rate. In particular, it is preferable
to simply using variables that are assumed to be highly correlated with marginal tax
rates, such as statutory tax rates, dummies which indicate whether a firm is reporting
losses or trichotomous variables, such as those used in Byoun (2008) or Gropp (2002).
Our first and main hypothesis follows directly from the theoretical rationale and
empirical evidence discussed previously, and is formulated as: “Since higher marginal
tax rates raise the value of tax savings, marginal tax rates should be positively related
to firms’ debt policy” (Hypothesis 1).
DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) introduced the idea of tax shield substitution, which
contends that holding investment (and hence expected income) constant, debt interest
competes with other allowable deductions as tax shelter. For example, if a more gener-
ous tax rule increases the firm’s depreciation allowance, then the firm’s optimal level
of debt should decrease due to its lower value as a tax shield. Therefore, firms can
substitute non-debt tax shields for debt tax shields. Following this rationale, firms with
a large amount of non-debt tax shields will have lower levels of debt than firms with a
small amount of non-debt tax shields. According to the debt substitution hypothesis,
there should be a negative relationship between non-debt tax shields and debt usage.
In this context, Mackie–Mason (1990) highlights the fact that the tax shield sub-
stitute hypothesis of DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) is more applicable to firms that
are close to being tax exhausted (i.e., firms that have a high probability of losing the
deductibility of their tax shields). Trezevant (1992) refers to this as the tax exhaustion
hypothesis. Moreover, Mackie–Mason (1990) takes issue with DeAngelo andMasulis
(1980) by pointing out that firms with more profitable projects tend to have larger
amounts of both depreciation and borrowing, and therefore non-debt tax shields may
have a positive rather than a negative association with leverage. In order to identify the
effect of debt substitution on tax exhaustion and profitability, Mackie–Mason (1990)
proposes considering not only non-debt tax shields but also the probability of bank-
ruptcy. It is likely that non-debt tax shields are a debt substitute for companies near
bankruptcy and therefore near to tax exhaustion. Conversely, financially healthy com-
panies that are far from tax exhaustion may jointly exploit both debt and non-debt tax
shields.
Hence our second hypothesis can be formulated as: “Non–debt tax shields on a
stand-alone basis, should be positively related to firms’ debt policy and non-debt tax
shields, weighted by the probability of bankruptcy, should be negatively related to
firms’ debt policy” (Hypothesis 2).
A stream of empirical research have examined the impact of taxes on the financing
decisions of firms using tax reforms as natural experiments. In this sense, changes in
the tax system are used as exogenous shocks to analyse whether companies respond
as predicted by theory. Representative work in this field includes, but is not limited to,
Alworth and Arachi (2001), An (2012), Panier et al. (2013), Doidge and Dyck (2015),
Faccio and Xu (2015), and Heider and Ljungqvist (2015). A particular area within
this research deals with the relationship between thin-capitalization rules or other
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interest deduction restrictions and company capital structure decisions. Alberternst
and Sureth (2015), and Dreßler and Scheuering (2015) investigate empirically the
impact of introducing a limitation to the interest fiscal deductibility in the course of
the German corporate tax reform of 2008. They all find evidence for the impact of
such thin-capitalization rule on companies’ debt ratio; specifically, companies that are
affected by the interest barrier reduce their leverage typically more than companies
that are not affected. Conversely, Blouin et al. (2014) examine the impact of thin-
capitalization rules that limit the tax deductibility of interest on the capital structure of
the foreign affiliates of USmultinationals in 54 countries. In line with previous studies,
they carve out a significant debt-reducing effect of different thin-capitalization rules
on foreign partners’ debt.
Based on the abovementioned discussion and taking the opportunity that offers
the Spanish corporate tax reform in 2012, we state our third and last hypothesis:
“Companies affected by the new thin-capitalization rule reduce their leverage ratio
after the reform more than those companies that are not affected” (Hypothesis 3).
3 The Spanish corporate tax setting
The regulation of corporate tax in Spain is contained in the Consolidated Text of
the Corporate Income Tax Law, approved by Legislative Royal Decree 4/2004, of
March 5th, and in the Corporate Income Tax Regulation approved by Royal Decree
1777/2004, of July 30th. It is worth noting that Spain is politically organised as a State
of Autonomous Regions, and two of these regions, namely the Basque Country and
Navarra, have special tax regimes called Economic Accord and Economic Agreement,
respectively, which differ to the other regions. Unless otherwise stated, we will focus
on the corporate tax regime generally applied in most of the Autonomous Regions in
Spain.
Corporate tax is determined by the statutory tax rate times taxable income. The
Spanish legislator reduced the statutory tax rate from 32.5 % for fiscal year 2007
to 30 % for fiscal years 2008–2013. On the other hand, corporate taxable income is
defined as the difference between period revenues and period expenses.5 Business
expenses are deductible if they are properly recorded and supported. By contrast with
other countries, Spanish corporate income tax treats income resulting from the transfer
of assets in the sameway as other income.Accordingly, such income is generally added
to (deducted from) regular business income to compute the taxable income.
Corporate taxable income is based on the income disclosed in the financial state-
ments and accounting records, adjusted in accordance with tax principles. The 2007
SpanishGeneral Accounting Plan approved byRoyalDecree 1514/2007, ofNovember
16th differentiates between the current income tax expense (income) and the deferred
income tax expense (income). The total tax expense or income is the sum of these two
items, which should nonetheless be quantified separately. On the one hand, the current
income tax expense is the amount payable by the company as a result of income tax
5 The tax period is the company’s business year. The annual tax return must be declared and the tax paid
within 25 days following the 6 months after the end of the business year.
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settlements for a given year. Conversely, the deferred income tax expense reflects in
essence the recognition and settlement of deferred tax assets and liabilities. A deferred
tax asset or liability represents the increase or decrease in taxes payable or refund-
able in future years as a result of temporary differences and any net operating loss or
tax credit carry-forwards that exist at the reporting date. Its value is computed with
reference to financial reporting standards for book income and tax rules for taxable
income. For instance, deferred tax assets can be created by the tax authority recogniz-
ing revenues and/or expenses outside of the times set out in the accounting standards.
In Spain “tax effect accounting”, which includes the concept of net tax deferred assets,
was first introduced in fiscal year 2007.
As in the majority of developed economies, the Spanish corporate tax system treats
profits and losses asymmetrically and allows carryover of corporate losses. The Span-
ish tax code allows companies to carry forward losses to offset taxable income in
future years, but unlike in other countries such as the US, Spanish firms cannot “carry
back” current losses to receive a tax refund for taxes paid in recent years.
Conventionally, financial expenses have been largely considered as deductible from
a fiscal point of view in Spain. The only restriction to this rule was those situations
with excess debt with related entities not resident in the European Union, with the
exception for those stablished in a territory classified as tax haven. The excess debt
was computed as the difference between the actual company’s indebtedness and the
result of applying a coefficient of three to equity, excluding income or loss of the year.
The interest generated by the excess debt was not considered as fiscally deductible;
rather, it was treated exactly the same as a dividend. In spite of the preceding rule,
corporate taxpayers could always submit to the Spanish fiscal authorities a proposal
for applying a higher ratio; if it was accepted, a different leverage threshold would
be applied.6 On March 30th, 2012, the Spanish Government approved several tax
measures with effect from fiscal years beginning from January 1st, 2012.7 Among
such measures, the tax reform introduced new rules affecting the deductibility of
financial expenses. In particular, it derogated the former Spanish thin-capitalization
regime and replaced it by a broader rule that stablishes limitations to the deductibility
of financial expenses incurred in excess of a given percentage of a Spanish borrower’s
adjusted operating profits regardless of whether or not the debt is with related parties.
Under the new tax regime, all net financial expenses (i.e. excess offinancial expenses
in respect of financial income) incurred by a Spanish corporate taxpayer in a given year
that exceed 30 % of such company’s annual operating profits8 will be non-deductible
for corporate tax purposes. Notwithstanding, there is a floor level to the previous
limitation, and it is fixed at 1 million euros of net financial expenses. Hence, net
financial expenses less or equal to 1 million euros shall be tax-deductible regardless
of the level of a company’s operating profits in a given year.
6 This possibility was not applicable to transactionsmadewith or by persons or entities resident in countries
or territories legally defined as tax havens.
7 These measures were included in Royal Decree Law 12/2012.
8 They basically correspond to earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA)
with certain adjustments. For more information on this issue, refer to Royal Decree Law 12/2012.
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The limitation on the deductibility of financial expenses has not been defined as a
permanent difference. Instead, net financial expenses that are not tax-deductible in a
given year, may be carried over and deducted in the 18 subsequent years of the fiscal
year in which such non-deductible amounts were generated, subject to the overall limit
of 30 % of the company’s operating profits.
Finally, the new thin-capitalization rule is not applicable to those corporate taxpay-
ers that do not belong to a Group of companies (i.e. independent companies), unless
more than 10 % of such company’s total net financial expenses derive from either: (1)
leverage that such company has with people or entities that hold an interest, directly
or indirectly, of at least 20 % in such company; or (2) leverage that such company has
with creditors in which such company holds an interest, directly or indirectly, of at
least 20 %.
4 Leverage, tax and control variables
Our baseline model establishes debt policy as a function of several tax variables and
control variables. Each variable, both dependent and independent, is discussed in detail
below. Specifically, we examine and propose some proxies for debt, taxes and non-debt
tax shields, since taxation and debt are the focus of our research. This is a key issue
since the specific explanatory variables used in any study significantly influence tax
effects; omitted variable biases are indeed quantitatively important (Feld et al. 2013).
4.1 Debt policy measures
A common issue in capital structure studies is identifying the appropriate measure
of leverage. Two approaches have been developed in the study of the effects of the
marginal tax rate on firms’ debt policy:
• On the one hand, according to the incremental approach, the debt ratio is not an
efficient measure of leverage as the dependent variable, since it is the cumulative
result of decisions taken over many years and thus may not fully reflect changes
in economic conditions. Therefore, when studying the effects of the marginal tax
rate on firms’ debt policy, it is more instructive to examine incremental financing
decisions rather than simply widely-used debt ratios. The fact that important debt
policy decisions in corporations may take a long time to be implemented sup-
ports this line of research. Studies that take this approach include Graham (1996a,
1996b), Shum (1996), Gropp (1997), Alworth and Arachi (2001), Kunieda et al.
(2011), Hartmann-Wendels et al. (2012) and Sinha and Bansal (2013).
• On the other hand, the cumulative approach proposes the use of debt level ratio
as the dependent variable. In this case, tax proxies are adjusted in some way in
order not to produce a spurious relationship with debt policy. As will be discussed
later on in Section 6, the potential endogeneity problem of the marginal tax rate is
avoided by using before-financing tax proxies. Studies that support this approach
include Graham et al. (1998), Graham (2000), Bartholdy and Mateus (2011) and
Hartmann-Wendels et al. (2012).
In turn, Welch (2011) argues that debt-to-asset ratio is an inappropriate measure for
capturing changes in leverage, especially when the ratio is to be used for capital
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structure studies, because total assets include non-financial liabilities, meaning that
non-financial liabilities are thus treated the same as equity. In its place, Welch (2011)
proposes the use of debt-to-capital employed ratio in such studies and therefore ignores
non-financial liabilities such as trade payables, which mainly depend on business
transactions and not on the effect of corporate income taxation.
In line with the previous rationale, this study employs two measures of leverage
by considering incremental debt level in the numerator and capital employed in the
denominator, thus:
• LEV1 is the first difference in long-term book debt divided by the sum of long-term
book debt and market value of equity.
• LEV2 is the same as LEV1 but using the lagged value of the denominator.9
4.2 Tax variables
Testing the impact of taxes on company financing decisions is arduous and open to
criticism. The main difficulty lies in finding an appropriate proxy for the company-
specific marginal tax rate, as its “true” value is not observable. The computation of
the marginal tax rate requires two sets of information: (1) the tax code treatment of
net operating losses, and (2) the managers’ expectations as to future income flows.
We estimate the marginal tax rates of Spanish firms by the Monte Carlo method using
Sinha and Bansal (2012) algorithm, which follows several stages. Firstly, we need a
forecast of future income flows based onmanagers’ expectations. Themodel proposed
by Shevlin (1990) can be used to generate the proxy for managers’ expectations, and
is based on the assumption that pre-tax income follows a random walk with drift.10
That is,
TIit = μit + εit (1)
TIi t being the first difference in pre-tax income (i.e. taxable income) of company
i in year t , μi t is the sample mean of TIi t and εi t is a normally distributed random
variable with zero mean and variance equal to that of TIi t over the sample period.
Although Shevlin 1990 uses historicalmean and variance of taxable income,we follow
Graham (1996b) and Alworth and Arachi (2001) for estimating the drifts and white
noises of equation (1) in order to avoid a reduction in the number of years available for
estimation. We use taxable income series calculated from the actual financial data for
individual firms in our sample, and consider the entire horizon of the carry-forward
sample. As Spanish tax code allows 15 years of loss carry-forward, we simulate future
income for 15 years.
9 We have also considered alternative leverage measures, including only debt financing. Unreported results
remain qualitatively and quantitatively the same as those obtained in Sect. 6.
10 Blouin et al. (2010) also simulate marginal tax rates but with a different assumption of future taxable
income. While Shevlin (1990) adopts a random walk assumption, Blouin et al. (2010) use a mean-reverting
process (namely, non-parametric procedure) to simulate future taxable income. Previous empirical evidence
has proved insignificant differences between the final MTR estimates under both procedures (see, for
instance, Ko and Yoon 2011).
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Most tax and capital structure research uses data drawn from financial statements
rather than data from actual tax returns (Gordon and Lee 2001; Contos 2005). In
absence of access to corporate tax returns, reported accounting figures must be used to
infer taxable income. Graham and Mills (2008) found that simulated tax rates based
on financial statement data are very highly correlated with tax variables based on tax
return data. Due to the fact that accounting income does not necessarily equals tax-
able income, the former should be adjusted to take into account timing or temporary
differences. These differences are categorized as taxable temporary differences (i.e.
deferred tax liabilities) and deductible temporary differences (i.e. deferred tax assets).
The former will result in higher tax payments or lower recoverable tax in future report-
ing periods, while the latter will result in lower tax payments or higher recoverable
tax in future reporting periods. As a result, we calculate taxable income as follows,
TIit = EBTit − Net tax deferred assetsit
Statutory tax ratet
, (2)
where EBT is earnings before taxes, and net tax deferred assets is the difference
between deferred tax assets and deferred tax liabilities coming from the balance
sheet.11 We divide the subtrahend term by the corporate statutory tax rate in order
to come up with a gross measure of tax base.
Secondly, using the simulated taxable income, we calculate the corporate tax bill
(Tit ) with the statutory tax rates and the loss carry-forward rules of the Spanish cor-
porate tax system.





(1 + R)t−2007 , (3)
where Tit is the corporate tax bill and R is the discount rate.12
After adding one euro to the taxable income values used above, we recalculate
the annual corporate tax bills. We consider increase in taxable income for the initial
period of the simulation time horizon as in Shevlin (1990) and Graham (1996a). We









(1 + R)t−2007 (4)
Fourthly, we take the difference between the present values of Eqs. (3) and (4) in order
to obtain a single value of the marginal tax rate.
11 See Sect. 3 for more information.
12 Although Shevlin (1990) and Graham (1996a) use the corporate bond rates of individual firms, we
use the internal rate of return of 10-year government bonds for all firms (http://www.afi.es/infoanalistas/
indicesAfi/mostrarIndicesAfi.asp) as not all Spanish listed firms issue long-term bonds.
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Fifthly, we repeat the process 10,000 times and the average of these simulated
marginal tax rates is the (expected) marginal corporate tax rate (MTR) of firm i .13
Averaging these marginal tax rates should represent managers’ expectation of the
marginal tax rate. This simulation process is carried out for all companies in the
sample.
As will be discussed in Sect. 5, we also calculate another series of (expected)
marginal corporate tax rates based on an alternative measure of income: earnings
before interest and taxes. We thus obtain two series of marginal tax rates: the after-
interest MTR, simply denoted MTR, and the pre-interest MTR, which we designate
MTREBIT.
We have also computed a non-debt tax shield variable (NDTS), which is the first
difference in book depreciation14 divided by the sum of lagged book total debt plus
lagged market equity value. In addition, we have calculated an interaction variable
(NDTS*RISK) which is NDTS multiplied by a bankruptcy probability index.15
4.3 Control variables
The different theories of capital structure suggest that, besides taxes, there are several
other determinants of debt policy (Frank and Goyal 2009). We use the following
variables, described below, as control variables in our regression analysis.
• Probability of bankruptcy (RISK): we use a bankruptcy probability index based
on accounting ratios, which is a variant of Altman (1968) Z-Score. In line with
Mackie–Mason (1990) and Graham (1996a) we calculate this variable as total
assets divided by the sum of 3.3 times EBIT, 1.0 times sales, 1.4 times retained
earnings and 1.2 times working capital. The trade-off theory of capital structure
predicts that if the bankruptcy probability of a firm is higher, then the expected
cost of financial distress is also higher, and the firm tends to reduce its debt ratio
accordingly.
• Tangibility (TANG): we compute the percentage of tangible assets over total assets.
If a higher tangibility ratio implies a lower probability of bankruptcy, the trade-off
theory predicts that firms with higher tangibility ratios will tend to have higher
debt ratios. This is in line with an emphasis on the agency cost of debt, as tangible
assets can easily be used as collateral for debt.
• Size (SIZE): we use the natural logarithm of total assets. Since the bankruptcy
probability of larger firms is lower due to their more widely-diversified business,
the trade-off theory predicts that larger firms will have higher debt ratios.
• Profitability (PROF): we calculate the ratio of earnings before interest, taxes,
depreciation and amortization (i.e. EBITDA) to total assets. Profitable companies
13 While Shevlin (1990) and Graham (1996a) only repeat this procedure 50 times for each firm, we repeat
this simulation 10,000 times for each firm to obtain more stable results.
14 Although NDTS has often included both depreciation and investment tax credit in previous US studies
(see Bradley et al. 1984; Mackie–Mason 1990), we include only depreciation, as investment tax credit is
less important in the Spanish corporate tax system than in the US corporate tax system.
15 See the next subsection relating to control variables for a description of this bankruptcy probability
index.
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generate more cash than less profitable firms do for a given leverage level, and
they face lower probability of default and lower expected costs of financial distress.
Moreover, profitable firms find interest tax shields more valuable. Consequently,
the trade-off theory expects that more profitable firms will be more financially
indebted. Furthermore, the use of more debt in more profitable firms will help
generating less agency costs coming from managers in their discretionary use of
internal funds.
• Growth opportunities (TOBIN ′S Q): we use the market to book total assets ratio.
The increase in leverage to finance future growth opportunities might lead to
underinvestment. Growth increases costs of financial distress, reduces free cash
problems and exacerbates debt-related agency problems. Therefore, the theory
of capital structure expects a negative relation between debt level and growth
opportunities.
Table 7 in the Appendix provides a summary of the definitions of the dependent and
explanatory variables.
5 Data and descriptive analysis
The data used in this paper come from three sources. The Sistema de Análisis de
Balances Ibéricos (SABI), a databasemanaged byBureauVanDijk and InformaD&B,
S.A., and the Spanish Securities and Exchange Commission (CNMV), provide the
accounting information from annual accounts16, while financial market information
comes from the quotation bulletins of the Spanish Stock Exchange.
Our sample comprises Spanish listed companies with information for the 7-year
period spanning 2007 to 2013. We focus on listed companies due to the fact that we
need information on market data to calculate dependent and explanatory variables. On
the other hand, we concentrate on this particular period because the necessary data
for estimating firm-specific marginal tax rates using the method of Shevlin (1990)
and Graham (1996a) have only been available since fiscal year 2007 in Spain.17 Fur-
thermore, International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs) were implemented in
Spain on January 1st 2008. The adoption of these IFRSs allows comparing our results
from the capital structure of Spanish listed companies with those from other markets
that have also adopted IFRSs.
As per standard practice in the empirical literature, we disregard financial insti-
tutions, utilities and governmental enterprises since these types of companies are
intrinsically different in terms of the nature of their operations and financial account-
ing information. We also exclude companies with negative equity, i.e. near-bankrupt
firms. Overall, we have a balanced data panel containing 88 companies with a total of
616 observations.
16 Detailed information for tax purposes is gathered only on the annual report, and this accounting statement
is not available on SABI database; instead, it is actually accessible at CNMV registries for listed companies.
17 As in many other countries, data based on financial statements do not reflect tax accounting conventions
and companies’ actual tax incentives. See Sect. 3 for more information.
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics
Category Variables Mean Median Standard
Deviation
Min. Max.
Leverage Variables LEV1 −0.014 0.000 0.243 −1.958 0.620
LEV2 0.024 0.000 0.210 −0.642 1.384
Tax Variables MTR 0.179 0.189 0.077 0.000 0.300
MTREBIT 0.182 0.191 0.080 0.000 0.300
NDTS 0.003 0.002 0.476 −3.143 2.140
NDTS*RISK −0.458 0.005 6.178 −94.307 13.909
Control Variables RISK 4.328 1.298 40.816 −110.459 428.616
TANG 0.109 0.034 0.163 0.000 0.845
SIZE 20.502 20.460 1.940 16.025 25.634
PROF 0.055 0.047 0.098 −0.426 0.471
TOBIN’S Q 1.610 1.261 1.297 0.299 8.885
NDTS and NDTS*RISK have been rescaled by a factor of 100. Table 7 in the Appendix provides definitions
of all the variables
Table 8 in the Appendix includes several key figures describing our firm’s sample
and compares themwith those of the population of large corporate taxpayers (LCTP) in
Spain with a total income higher than 180 million euros.18 As reported, the relevance
and representativeness of our sample is noteworthy. For instance, both total assets
and total debt comprise approximately one fifth of the population data, with a similar
coverage for financial expense. In the case of tax expense, our sample represents a
maximum of almost 90 % of the population data in 2012 and a minimum of 11 % a
year before. As far as earnings is concerned, around half of the earnings before interest
and taxes (EBIT) of the population is covered by our sample data, approximately one
third in the case of earnings before taxes (EBT), and nearly one fifth in the case of net
income.
In order to reduce the effect of outliers, all variables are winsorized at 0.5 % in
each tail of the distribution. Table 1 presents summary statistics of the dependent and
explanatory variables.
The average annual growth in company debt was equal to −1.41 % of capital
employed and 2.44 % of lagged capital employed.19 The average of the estimated
marginal tax rates of all firms is 17.93 % (18.18 % for MTREBIT), which is much
lower than the statutory tax rate (32.50 % for fiscal year 2007 and 30.00 % for fiscal
year 2008 onwards). This gap is caused by asymmetrical tax treatment of profits and
18 For comparison purposes, we focus on non-financial companies and total income that exceeds 180
million euros as our sample has a mean total income of 557 million euros.
19 The mean values of the leverage variables have opposite signs because, on average, the value of
the firm increases with the average amount of debt. Remember that LEV1 is  Debt / Vt, where the
denominator is the sum of debt and equity, while LEV2 = LEV1 (Vt/ Vt−1). It follows that, on average,
Vt / Vt−1 > 1 (Vt/ Vt−1 < 1) when Debtt > Debtt−1 (Debtt < Debtt−1). Consequently, the quotient
Vt/ Vt−1 gives a greater weight to the observations of LEV1 that are positive, and a smaller weight to those
that are negative.
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Notes: Statutory Tax Rate is the corporate income tax rate established by the Spanish corporate tax 
code; MTR is the marginal tax rate estimated as per Shevlin (1990) and Graham (1996a); MTREBIT is 
the marginal tax rate estimated using earnings before interest and taxes as per Graham et al. (1998); 
ETR is taxes paid on profits divided by pre-tax book income, excluding extraordinary and 
discontinued items; ETRb is taxes accrued on profits divided by pre-tax book income, excluding 
















Fig. 1 Taxvariables, 2007–2013
losses and by the loss carry-forward provision in the Spanish corporate tax system. The
standard deviation of themarginal tax rates is 7.68% (7.98% forMTREBIT), implying
that there is moderate variation in the marginal tax rates of all firms. Therefore
The percentage of tangible assets over total assets averages about 11%. The average
size of the companies included in the sample is approximately e802 million in terms
of market value of assets. Besides, the average profitability of our sample amounts to
5.51 %, and the market to book ratio shows a 1.61 average value.
We have calculated the correlation matrix and, additionally, we have performed a
multicollinearity test using the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF). Results are reported in
Table 9 in the Appendix, and the low VIF values suggest that there is no collinearity
among the variables considered.
In order to compare our marginal tax rates variables (i.e. MTR and MTREBIT) with
other traditional tax measures, we have calculated ETR which is the ratio of taxes paid
on profits to pre-tax income, excluding extraordinary and discontinued items, as well
asETRb, whose numerator is taxes accrued on profits and has the same denominator as
the preceding ratio. Figure 1 shows the time evolution of the statutory tax rate, MTR,
MTREBIT, ETR and ETRb.
During the period 2007–2013, statutory tax rates remained mostly stable. Con-
versely, from 2008 onwards, there is an increasing number of companies with losses
(i.e. pre-tax book income and EBIT < 0). Simultaneously, the number of companies
with MTR and MTREBIT below 10 % increases. Overall, there is a downward trend
in both MTR and MTREBIT.
Figure 2 depicts the distribution of simulated marginal tax rates, calculated using
earnings before interest and taxes as the base for taxable income (MTREBITs) for the
sampled firms from 2007 to 2013, and an aggregation across all years in the sample.
The data reveal substantial variation in the marginal tax rate across firms and over
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Notes: MTREBIT is the marginal tax rate estimated using earnings before interest and taxes as per 








































Fig. 2 Marginal tax rate (mtrebit) distribution
time.20 In any given year, about 2 % of the firms haveMTREBITs equal to the top
statutory tax rate, roughly 10 % have MTREBITs below the 5 %, while the rest have
MTREBITs ranging between 5 % and the highest rate (i.e. 30 %). The cross-sectional
variation in tax rates occurs because of the carry-forward features of the tax code. The
relatively large percentage of low tax rates is due to the fact that over 27 % of the
observations in the sample represent firms with negative taxable income.
6 Empirical strategy and results
As Roberts and Whited (2013) state in their survey paper, the most important and
pervasive issue confronting studies in empirical corporate finance is endogeneity. In
the case of testing the impact of taxes on companies’ financing decisions, the difficulty
stems from the fact that any measure of marginal tax rates based on actual balance
sheet data is not exogenous. This is due to the marginal tax rate’s dependence on
past financing decisions: the higher the leverage ratio, the lower the taxable income
and the expected marginal tax rates because of the interest deductibility. This may
result in a negative relationship between leverage ratios and estimated marginal tax
rates even if high taxes encourage companies to use debt as a financing instrument.
Consequently, the endogeneity of the tax status may produce a spurious correlation
between the leverage ratio and the marginal tax rate, making it difficult, if not virtually
impossible, to draw causal inferences.
As discussed in Sect. 2, we have formulated three empirical hypotheses for our
research. The correct testing of these hypotheses requires the overcoming of the endo-
geneity issue, and as such we apply two different methodologies: regression based on
20 This figure and the one corresponding to the other marginal tax rate variable (i.e. MTR) turned out to
be very much alike.
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observables and difference in differences approach. Both of them will allow us to test
Hypotheses 1 and 2, and the latter one will be used in order to test Hypothesis 3.
6.1 Regression approach
Conventionally, there have been two possible solutions to the endogeneity problem
in the empirical literature (Graham et al. 1998). The first resembles a traditional way
of implementing an endogenous regressor in econometrics, that is, using the lagged
value of the simulated marginal tax rate as an explanatory variable. In turn, since the
simulated marginal tax rate based on the pre-tax income (and after interest) already
incorporates the firm’s leverage choices, a second possible solution to the endogeneity
problem uses income before interest to compute marginal tax rates. Therefore, this
second strategy considers the contemporaneous value of the marginal tax rate as an
explanatory variable but simulatedon abefore-financingbasis, i.e.with earnings before
interest. Our empirical research will use the latter solution to avoid the endogeneity of
marginal tax rates. Notwithstanding,wewill check as a robustness test the instrumental
variable solution.
Our regression model specifies companies’ capital structure as a function of tax
and control variables, which were discussed in detail in Sect. 4. Specifically, we use
a static model of leverage because we are not interested in an economic model of the
dynamic adjustment towards an optimal level of leverage. As there is an incremental
basis to our dependent variable, we use—as per Graham (1996a)—the changes in
possible determinants as explanatory variables, except for the variables MTREBIT,
NDTS*RISK and RISK. Therefore, our regression model equation is as follows:
LEVit = β0 + β1 · MTREBITit + β2 · NDTSit
+ β3 · NDTSit∗RISK + β4 · RISKit
+ β5 · TANGit + β6 · SIZEit + β7 · PROFit
+ β8 · TOBIN′S Qit + ηi + ηt + εit, (5)
where LEVit is a measure of leverage of firm i in year t ; MTREBIT represents the mar-
ginal tax rate estimated with earnings before interest and taxes; NDTS is the non-debt
tax shield variable; RISK is the probability of bankruptcy variable; TANG is the tangi-
bility variable; SIZE denotes the natural logarithm of total assets;PROF is the return on
assets ratio; TOBIN’S Q is the market to book assets ratio; ηi represents time-invariant
unobservable firm-specific effects (e.g., management performance, reputation, etc.)21;
ηt represents time-specific effects which are common to all firms andmay change over
time (e.g., macroeconomic conditions); and εi t is the disturbance term.
Table 2 shows the estimation results of our regression model for both leverage
measures LEV1 and LEV2.22
21 Lemmon et al. (2008) show that corporate capital structures are characterized by an important firm
specific effect.
22 To verify the character—fixed or random—of the unobservable individual effects, we use Hausman test.
This test rejects the null hypothesis regarding the absence of correlation between the unobservable effects
and the explanatory variables, which leads to the selection of the fixed-effect estimator.
123
376 SERIEs (2016) 7:359–391
Table 2 Estimation results of




Eq. (5) with robust standard
errors in brackets. Table 7 in the
Appendix provides definitions of
all the variables. Superscript
asterisks indicate statistical
significance at 0.01(***),
0.05(**) and 0.10(*) levels
Explanatory variables LEV1 LEV2
MTREBIT 2.188** (0.938) 1.078 (0.975)
NDTS 1.265 (1.601) 1.536 (1.724)
NDTS*RISK −0.395*** (0.073) −0.122 (0.091)
RISK −0.001* (0.000) −0.001* (0.000)
ΔTANG 0.244* (0.129) 0.239* (0.136)
ΔSIZE 0.281*** (0.077) 0.219*** (0.076)
ΔPROF 0.298* (0.1704) 0.296 (0.2475)
ΔTOBIN ′SQ −0.159*** (0.045) −0.083*** (0.017)
Observations 434 434
R-Squared Within 0.200 0.121
In the case of the regression for LEV1, with the exception of NDTS all parame-
ter estimates have the expected signs and are statistically significant. To address the
economic significance of the estimated coefficient of 2.188 on MTREBIT reported in
Table 2, consider the impact on leverage policy resulting from a movement from aver-
age MTREBIT of 0.182 (see Table 1) to the maximum for the sample period (0.300).
All else equal, a hypothetical firm with a marginal tax rate of 30.00 % would increase
the use of net debt (i.e. the change in its debt ratio) by 25.86 % points, compared
to an identical firm with a marginal tax rate of 18.20 %. If we get the standardized
regression coefficients, MTREBIT appears to be the strongest predictor in the model
and a one standard deviation increase in MTREBIT leads to a 0.720 standard deviation
increase in predicted leverage change, with the other variables held constant.
When LEV2 is used as dependent variable, the most important difference from
the previous results is that MTREBIT is no longer statistically significant. Therefore,
we partially confirm our Hypothesis 1 whereby debt policy and marginal tax rates
are positively related. Moreover, the results in the case of dependent variable LEV1
support our Hypothesis 2 regarding non-debt tax shields. Control variables show the
typical and expected coefficient signs.
6.2 Difference in differences approach
An alternative approach to overcome the endogeneity problem of the tax status in
capital structure research, is to look for exogenous changes in tax laws, and then analyse
how companies react to those changes by adjusting their debt ratios. In particular, we
study the impact of the 2012 reform of the Spanish corporate tax income. Accordingly,
we use a difference in differences approach (DiD)23 and divide our firms’ sample into
a treatment group and a control group. We design the treatment group by identifying
23 We refer to Roberts and Whited (2013) for an in depth review of econometric techniques aimed at
addressing endogeneity problems, including techniques such as DiD that rely on a clear source of exogenous
variation.
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those companies that are likely to be affected by the new thin-capitalization rule. For
that reason, the classification criteria relates to the following:
• A company is included in the treatment group if, in 2012, its net financial expenses
exceed 30 % of EBITDA, considering net interest expense surpasses 1 million
euros, it is considered as a fiscal group, and its tax residence is located in any
Spanish Autonomous Region except the Basque Country or Navarra.24
• A company is assigned to the control group if it does not meet any of the previous
criteria. For instance, a company whose tax residence is located in the Basque
Country or Navarre will belong to this group albeit its financial expenses level.
According to the previous treatment and control groups definitions, 25 companies (175
observations) were classified as treated and the other 63 companies (441 observations)
were included in the control group. Therefore, approximately 28 % of the companies
in our sample were potentially affected by the new thin-capitalization rule. The main
characteristics of the companies of both treatment and control groups are reported in
Table 10 in the Appendix. As expected, the treatment group shows a 13% points larger
average debt level than the control group. It is likely that the treatment group has a
higher absolute value of leverage than the control group. Treatment group companies
must have correspondingly high interest expenses to ensure that the tax deductibility
restriction applies, while companies in the control group will not incur in such high
interest allowances. Additionally, treated companies have a lower average tangibility,
a lower average profitability and a lower market-to-book ratio compared with control
group firms.
Under the DiD approach, also known as “interaction among dummy variables”, we
construct two dummy variables: the first one is called TREATED which is equal to 1
if the company belongs to the treatment group and zero otherwise, and controls for
permanent differences between the treatment and control groups; the second one is
called TAX_REFORM which is equal to 1 for fiscal years 2012 and 2013 (i.e. after the
implementation of the corporate tax reform) and 0 for all the preceding fiscal years,
and it controls for trends common to both treatment and control groups. The resulting
DiD model with the inclusion of the two new dummy variables is:
LEVit = β0 + β1 · TREATEDit + β2 · TAX_REFORM it








·CONTROL VARIABLESkit + ηi + εit (6)
24 The special tax regimes in these Autonomous Regions do not apply the same thin-capitalization rule
than in the rest of the Spanish Autonomous Regions.
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Where the dependent variable, and tax and control variables have been identi-
fied before in Eq. (5); ηi is the fixed effect for company i; and εi t is the residual
term. We have added company-fixed effects in order to capture all time-constant
effects that might be responsible for a company to be a high- or low-leveraged firm
in general; therefore, the TREATED dummy variable is not identified in the esti-
mation of Eq. (6) The interaction term TREATED*TAX_REFORM equals 1 when
company i belongs to the treatment group and year t is 2012 or 2013; conversely,
it is equal to zero otherwise. The observable variables in Eq. (6) will have two
potential outcomes corresponding to the outcomes under the treatment and the
control groups. The treatment effect is the difference between the two potential
outcomes. In particular, the β3 coefficient gives the DiD estimate of the treat-
ment effect, namely the change in the debt ratio of the treatment group and that
of the control group before and after the tax reform came into effect. We expect
this coefficient to be negative, which indicates that the debt ratio of the treated
companies declines compared to their counterparts in the control group after the
reform.
While it is likely to see a sharp change in behavior among the treatment group
following the exogenous shock that is the limitation to the tax deductibility of finan-
cial expenses, it is not expected to see such a change in the control group that
is not affected by that shock. As Roberts and Whited (2013) point out, the key
assumption for consistency of the DiD estimator is what is called the zero corre-
lation assumption. In economic terms, this condition implies that, in the absence of
the treatment, the evolution in the variable of interest (in our case, leverage) would
have been identical for both the treatment and control groups. This assumption is
often referred to as the parallel trends assumption because it requires any trends in
the dependent variable for the two groups of companies prior to the treatment to be
the same (Angrist and Pischke 2009). While level differences of outcomes between
the treatment and control groups as well as common trends of outcomes for both
treated and control companies are easily handled by the DiD estimator, differential
trends among the two groups will generally lead to inconclusive or erroneous infer-
ences.
The same as with all endogeneity problems, we cannot formally test the parallel
trends assumption. Even though similar pre-treatment trends are reassuring, for exam-
ple performing a mean-difference t test, they are not a sufficient condition to ensure
that the endogeneity problem has been amended. Notwithstanding, and as we have
more than 1-year pre-reform data, we can compare the trends in the outcome variable
during the time frame prior to 2012 for both treatment group companies and their non-
treated counterparts. Figure 3 illustrates the time evolution of the debt level scaled by
total assets of both treatment (i.e. companies affected by the tax reform) and control
(i.e. companies not affected by the tax reform) groups.
The mean debt level of the treatment group companies increases slightly through-
out the whole period. Overall, an increase of approximately 2.89 % from 29.78 %
in 2008 to 32.67 % in 2013 can be observed. Conversely, not affected or control
group companies increase their mean debt level by a 2.84 % from 19.20 % in 2008
to 22.04 % in 2013. On a closer examination, the mean leverage reaches a maxi-
mum of 47.11 % (23.82 %) for treated (non-treated) companies in 2012. In terms of
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Notes: the treatment group is defined as companies affected by the tax reform, while the 
control group includes companies not affected by the reform. Difference is the treatment 
















Fig. 3 Debt level time evolution of treated vs. control companies
the direction of the post-reform response, it is expected that companies in the treat-
ment group reduce their leverage position more strongly than those counterparts in
the control group. As Fig. 3 illustrates, there is a significant decrease in the mean
debt level of 14.44 % for the treatment group from 2012 to 2013, while this reduc-
tion was only of 1.78 % for the control group. From a simple descriptive perspective,
Fig. 3 shows that on average companies affected by the 2012 corporate tax reform
reduce their debt ratio after the reform to a much larger extent than their not affected
counterparts. Next, we formally test whether this difference is statistically signifi-
cant.
Table 3 depicts the estimation results of our difference in difference regression
model coming from Eq. 6. As An (2012), Kahle and Stulz (2013), and Dreßler and
Scheuering (2015), we employ a fixed effects DiD approach as fixed effects regres-
sion controls for companies’ unobserved and time-invariant characteristics that may
influence the outcome variable.25
Columns (1) and (2) in Table 3 show the estimates from the DiD regression model
without and with covariates, respectively. The interaction term, TREATED*TAX_
REFORM, captures to what extent companies in the treatment group adjust their lever-
age when they are affected by the 2012 tax reform. The coefficient of this interaction
25 Hausman test rejects the null hypothesis regarding the absence of correlation between the unobservable
effects and the explanatory variables, which leads to the selection of the fixed-effect estimator.
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Table 3 Regression estimation results under the DiD approach
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
TAX_REFORM −0.008 (0.021) 0.038 (0.028) −0.047* (0.028) −0.008 (0.036)
TREATED*TAX_
REFORM
−0.178** (0.069) −0.124** (0.054) 0.055 (0.062) 0.072 (0.069)
MTREBIT 2.216** (1.043) 1.661 (1.076)
NDTS 1.881 (1.601) 0.703 (2.640)
NDTS*RISK −0.398*** (0.113) 0.225** (0.0922)
RISK −0.001** (0.000) −0.000** (0.000)
ΔTANG 0.231* (0.125) 0.138 (0.148)
ΔSIZE 0.268*** (0.076) 0.225*** (0.069)
ΔPROF 0.273* (0.178) −0.098 (0.150)
ΔTOBIN ′SQ −0.153*** (0.045) −0.076*** (0.025)
Observations 528 434 352 258
R-Squared Within 0.043 0.214 0.011 0.129
Columns (1) and (2) include fixed-effect regression coefficients estimated from Eq. (6) without and with
covariates, respectively. Regressions in columns (3) and (4) restrict the sample to years 2007–2011 and use
a fake tax policy in 2011 as a placebo. The dependent variable is debt level scaled by total assets in all
regressions. TAX_REFORM is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for data after the tax reform, and
TREATED is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the company is affected by the 2012 corporate
tax reform. Table 7 in the Appendix provides definitions of the rest of the variables. Superscript asterisks
indicate statistical significance at 0.01(***), 0.05(**) and 0.10(*) levels. Robust standard errors are in
brackets
term has turned out to be negative and statistically significant at the 5 % level in
both regressions. This negative sign implies that those companies affected by the new
thin-capitalization rule reduce their indebtedness stronger than those counterparts not
affected. Specifically, and without including covariates, the change of the pre- to post-
reform debt ratio is 18 percentage points lower for the treatment group compared to
the control group. After controlling for other factors, the second column of Table 3
depicts that the average debt ratio in the treatment group declines more by 12 per-
centage points relative to the control group. Therefore, our Hypothesis 3 is confirmed
which can be interpreted as there does seem to exist a tax reform effect.
As far as the rest of estimates is concerned, the signs and significance of the coef-
ficients remain qualitative and quantitatively alike to those encountered in Table 2.
Consequently, Hypotheses 1 and 2 are again confirmed.
Furthermore, we carry out a falsification test in order to validate whether there was
a parallel trend of the dependent variable between treatment and control groups in the
pre-reformperiod (i.e. before fiscal year 2012). In thisway,we examinewhether poten-
tial treated and untreated companies had a different development of their debt ratio in a
placebo reform. Specifically, we restrict our sample time horizon to years 2007–2011,
and establish as a placebo a fake tax policy in 2011. Columns (3) and (4) in Table 3
report the results of this test without and with covariates, respectively. As expected,
the DiD estimate of the treatment effect is neither statistically and nor economically
significant; in other words, the difference in leverage ratios between treatment and
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Table 4 Estimation results of
the capital structure model from




Eq. (5) with robust standard
errors in brackets. Table 7 in the




0.05(**) and 0.10(*) levels
Explanatory variables LEV1 LEV2
LAGGED_MTR 1.275* (0.748) 0.299 (0.681)
NDTS 1.654 (2.015) 2.742 (2.121)
NDTS*RISK −0.395*** (0.099) −0.125 (0.089)
RISK −0.001* (0.000) −0.001* (0.000)
ΔTANG 0.319** (0.156) 0.351** (0.143)
ΔSIZE 0.259*** (0.080) 0.174** (0.077)
ΔPROF 0.423** (0.172) 0.430 (0.273)
ΔTOBIN ′SQ −0.155*** (0.047) −0.076*** (0.016)
Observations 370 370
R-Squared Within 0.203 0.129
control groups is insignificant for every year considered prior to the 2012 tax reform.
This implies that the analysed companies do not differ in the financial behaviour and
all the companies react in the same way. This finding constitutes evidence that there
is a parallel trend between the two groups in the years before the tax reform.
7 Robustness of results
In order to assess the robustness of our previous empirical evidence, we perform three
different tests.
Firstly, in the regression approach that we have applied in the preceding Section, a
pre-interest income measure of the marginal tax rate was used in order to confront the
endogeneity problem. This solution evades the effect of financing decisions, and thus
alleviates the non-exogeneity tax status of companies. Nevertheless, there still could
exist biases in this measure due to potential earnings manipulation from managers
in order to influence the marginal tax rate and hence, the company’s debt policy.
Consequently, as a robustness check we have instrumented the leverage dependent
variable with its lag. Table 4 presents the results of this new estimation and corroborate
our previous findings.
Secondly, the relationship betweenmarginal tax rates and debt policy could be influ-
enced by the leverage status of the companies. Specifically, the positive effect of taxa-
tion on leverage should be stronger for less levered firms, which presumably havemore
incentive to increase their debt. In order to test this issuewe calculate a dummyvariable
(DUMMY_LEV) that equals 1 if the debt ratio is below themedian and 0 otherwise. Fur-
thermore, we introduce in the regression MTREBIT*DUMMY_LEV which is an inter-
action term resulting from the multiplication of the dummy variable DUMMY_LEV
and the MTREBIT variable. Table 5 contains the estimation results and shows that the
coefficient associated with the interaction term is only statistically significant for the
dependent variable LEV1. Its positive sign indicates a more intense positive effect of
taxes on debt for firms with a less levered status. In the sample of more levered firms,
the effect of MTREBIT on debt policy is equal to 2.4, while among less levered firms
the impact is 1.1 higher, although this difference is only marginally significant.
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Table 5 Estimation results of
the capital structure model from
Eq. (5) controlling for leverage
Fixed-effect regression
coefficients estimated from
Eq. (5) with robust standard
errors in brackets. Table 7 in the




0.05(**) and 0.10(*) levels
Explanatory Variables LEV1 LEV2
MTREBIT 2.383*** (0.787) 1.454 (0.964)
NDTS 1.785 (1.226) 2.103 (1.493)
NDTS*RISK −0.402*** (0.067) −0.138* (0.083)
RISK −0.001* (0.000) −0.001** (0.000)
ΔTANG 0.167 (0.144) 0.162 (0.147)
ΔSIZE 0.281*** (0.071) 0.221*** (0.075)
ΔPROF 0.267* (0.140) 0.270 (0.217)
ΔTOBIN ′SQ −0.133*** (0.032) −0.066*** (0.018)
DUMMY_LEV −0.480*** (0.162) −0.230*** (0.081)
MTREBIT*DUMMY_LEV 1.103* (0.627) 0.096 (0.434)
Observations 434 434
R-Squared Within 0.307 0.187
Table 6 Estimation results of
the capital structure model from




Eq. (5) with robust standard
errors in brackets. Table 7 in the




0.05(**) and 0.10(*) levels
Explanatory variables LEV1 LEV2
TAX DIFFERENCE −1.192 (0.834) −0.096 (0.735)
NDTS 1.581 (2.037) 2.768 (2.114)
NDTS*RISK −0.387** (0.096) −0.120 (0.089)
RISK −0.000* (0.000) −0.001* (0.000)
ΔTANG 0.319** (0.156) 0.344** (0.141)
ΔSIZE 0.257*** (0.079) 0.175*** (0.077)
ΔPROF 0.428** (0.172) 0.434 (0.272)
ΔTOBIN ′SQ −0.158*** (0.046) −0.078*** (0.164)
Observations 370 370
R-Squared Within 0.200 0.129
Thirdly, if managers make decisions based on their firm’s current statutory tax
status, higher debt figures would be observed for companies with greater differences
between their statutory tax rate and marginal tax rate. Therefore, we construct a TAX
DIFFERENCE variable as per Graham (1996a) and Sinha and Bansal (2013), which
is the result of the statutory tax rate minus the marginal tax rate. According to this
rationale, we expect this tax difference variable to be positively related to debt usage
if companies make tax-based leverage decisions based on their statutory tax rates.
Conversely, the coefficient on this variable will be zero or non-significant if firms
make tax-based leverage decisions based exclusively on simulated marginal tax rates.
Wehave used the lagged values of this variable, andwehave controlled for themarginal
tax rate in the regression though it is dropped due to collinearity. Table 6 reports the
estimation results and shows companies make debt decisions based on their marginal
tax rate and not the statutory tax rate.
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8 Concluding remarks
This paper provides empirical evidence on the statistical and economic impact of taxes
on debt policy, using a data panel of Spanish listed companies covering the period
2007–2013. It is the first empirical analysis of the relationship between firm-specific
marginal tax rates and leverage measures of individual firms in Spain. Moreover, we
investigate for the first time whether the introduction of interest deductibility restric-
tions put forth by the Spain’s 2012 corporate tax reform has an impact on the capital
structure of listed companies.
We follow the Graham (1996a) and Shevlin (1990) methodology for computing
company-specific marginal tax rates, relying on the non-linearity of corporate tax
schedules resulting fromcompany losses and the ensuing tax provisions (carry-forward
rules). This procedure accounts for the fact that firms may report losses, and in that
case, the debt tax shield cannot be used immediately but will offset future positive
taxable income. Furthermore, we control for the endogeneity problem stemming from
the reverse causality between debt and taxes. We circumvent this problem by basing
our marginal tax rate measure on income before the relevant financing decisions. Our
results suggest that there is a positive relationship between the firm-specific marginal
tax rates and the leverage ratio increase of Spanish firms. As expected, we have also
found that less levered firms tend to use debt tax shields more intensively as they are
more likely to increase debt.
In addition, we have also tested the non-debt tax shields hypothesis. Our findings
indicate that firms with greater amounts of non-debt tax shields have lower levels
of debt, substituting debt tax shields for other tax allowances such as depreciation
expenses.
We have examined the impact of taxes on the financing decisions of firms using the
Spanish corporate tax reform of 2012 as a “quasi-experiment”. Accordingly, we iden-
tify companies that would in theory have been affected by the new thin-capitalization
rule, and compare their financing behaviour to a group of companies that were not
affected. Thin capitalization rules prevent firms from deducting excessive interest
expenses from their tax base. Therefore, it is expected that companies that are affected
by interest deductibility limitations reduce their debt ratio. Our empirical results, with
a difference in differences approach, point towards differences between the debt pol-
icy of potential affected firms and their non-affected counterparts, with a negative and
statistically significant treatment effect.
Our study may be subject to several potential caveats. Firstly, access to tax related
data is a complex issue in most developed countries. In Spain, the taxable income
of corporations and therefore deferred tax assets and liabilities has been explicitly
included in financial statements from fiscal year 2007 onwards which makes the time
horizon of our study relatively short. As more historical tax data become available, we
expect improved results and availability of more accurate values for marginal tax rates.
Moreover, the effect of taxes on companies’ debt policy might be conditioned by time
issues as previous research indicate that financing choices are mostly long-term deci-
sions and companies adapt their structure only very slowly (Fama and French 2012).
Secondly, in our study we have focused on corporate income taxes generated by
parent companies located in Spain. We are aware that these companies typically con-
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stitute a group of companies (i.e. parent or principal and subsidiaries) with operations
in different tax settings. Consequently, the impact of taxes on their debt policies might
be lower than the actual obtained in the present study because these companies can
shift profits into low-tax jurisdictions. One of the main implications of this is that the
marginal tax rate should be estimated on a group of companies basis instead of an
individual one. What is more, it would be necessary to consider the specific corporate
tax schemes in each of the countries where the corporate group operates. The inclusion
of international corporate taxation goes beyond the scope of our study, and this subject
should be subject to future research.
Thirdly, the marginal tax rates may either overstate or understate the fiscal benefit
of debt financing according to whether, at the personal level, interest income is taxed
at a higher or lower rate than returns from common stocks. Therefore, an interesting
future line of research would be to analyse whether not only corporate taxes but also
personal taxes affect corporate financing decisions in Spain. Fourthly, another issue
worth noting is the fact that the findings may be strongly influenced by the use of listed
as opposed to unlisted firms, since listed firms can raise capital more easily thanks
to the less severe agency problems and asymmetric information (López-Gracia and
Sogorb-Mira 2014). As a result, it would also be interesting to evaluate the relation
between firm leverage and taxation using a dataset of unlisted companies.
Finally, it is very important to understand whether managers consider tax related
features of a particular source of finance or not. All other factors affecting capital
structure are internal to a company, but taxes may be exogenously determined and
used to control a company’s actions to some extent. In terms of tax policy, our findings
prove that asymmetric treatment of equity and debt in the Spanish corporate tax system
affects the debt policies of Spanish listed companies. While considering the new thin-
capitalization rule stablished by Spanish government in 2012, there appears to be a
clear effect on the debt policy of Spanish listed companies due to the new limitation
of financing expenses deductibility. Therefore, policy makers might be encouraged to
revise and re-evaluate corporate tax reform in order to consider the inequality in tax
treatment of debt and equity financing in Spain.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 Interna-
tional License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution,
and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the
source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
9 Appendix
See Tables 7, 8, 9 and 10.
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Table 7 Definition of variables
Variables Definition
LEV1 First difference in long-term book debt divided by the sum of long-term book debt
and market value of equity
LEV2 The same as LEV1 but using the lagged value of the denominator
MTR Marginal tax rate estimated as per Shevlin (1990) and Graham (1996a) approach
MTREBIT Marginal tax rate estimated with earnings before interest and taxes as per Graham
et al. (1998) approach
NDTS First difference in book depreciation divided by the sum of lagged book total debt
plus lagged market equity value
RISK 1 / [(3.3*EBIT/Total Assets) + (1.0*Sales/Total Assets) + (1.4*Retained
Earnings/Total Assets) + (1.2*Working Capital/Total Assets)]
TANG Percentage of tangible assets over total assets
SIZE Natural logarithm of total assets
PROF Ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization to total assets
TOBIN’S Q Market to book ratio of total assets
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Table 10 Characteristics of treatment group versus control group
Variable Treatment group Control group Mean difference t test
Debt to assets market value 0.328 0.200 0.128 ∗ ∗∗
MTREBIT 0.185 0.181 0.004
NDTS −0.007 0.007 −0.014
NDTS*RISK −1.429 −0.078 −1.351 ∗ ∗
RISK 7.556 3.062 4.494
TANG 0.064 0.126 −0.062 ∗ ∗∗
SIZE 20.374 20.553 −0.179
PROF 0.019 0.069 −0.050 ∗ ∗∗
TOBIN’S Q 1.298 1.734 −0.436 ∗ ∗∗
This table compares the means of key variables between companies assigned to the treatment group and
companies included in the control group. The total sample of 88 companies (616 observations) is distributed
between 25 companies (175 observations) of the treatment group and 63 companies (441 observations) of
the control group.NDTS andNDTS*RISK have been rescaled by a factor of 100. Table 7 provides definitions
of the variables. The last column on the right hand side show the result of a t test if the mean values between
the treatment group and the control group are statistically equal. Superscript asterisks indicate statistical
significance at 0.01(***), 0.05(**) and 0.10(*) levels
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